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WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AFTER SEAGATE: HOW THE
WILLFULNESS STANDARD HAS CHANGED AND WHAT
ATTORNEYS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IT
Kevin Raudebaugh1
©Kevin Raudebaugh
ABSTRACT
In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit changed the standard for willful patent
infringement from one akin to negligence, to one more aligned
with recklessness. While the general standard is set forth in the
decision, the Seagate Court stated that it would leave the
development of the new standard’s meaning to future cases.
This Article surveys cases applying Seagate to determine the
meaning of this novel standard, and explores what evidence
courts have considered relevant to the willfulness inquiry. This
Article also discusses how Seagate has affected the desirability
of opinions of counsel and clearance searches, and concludes
with recommendations for practicing attorneys about how to
avoid willfulness charges.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>Patent infringement lawsuits have some of the highest 1
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damages awards in private litigation, with jury awards and
settlements regularly in the hundreds of millions of dollars.2  A
finding of willfulness raises the stakes in a patent infringement
suit because it carries up to a treble damages penalty under the
Patent Act.3  Due to the incentive of treble damages, willfulness
is frequently alleged; one study has shown that willfulness is
alleged in over 90% of infringement cases.4  Thus, it is
particularly important for attorneys dealing with patented
technology to be aware of ways to defend against and avoid
charges of willfulness.
<2>The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) radically changed the standard for willfulness in In re
Seagate Technology, LLC. The Seagate Court made it much
easier to defend against willfulness charges, but left questions
as to how the new standard would be interpreted by the
courts.5  Since Seagate, a number of opinions by United States
District Courts and the CAFC have made it easier to interpret its
impact. From the subsequent opinions, as well as Seagate itself,
conclusions can be drawn regarding what measures are effective
for defending against a charge of willfulness. This Article begins
by describing the state of willfulness before Seagate. It will then
analyze the main holdings of the Seagate opinion before
examining court opinions subsequent to Seagate to determine
how the standard is being developed and applied.
WILLFULNESS BEFORE SEAGATE
<3>Prior to Seagate, courts judged willfulness by what was, in
essence, a negligence standard.6  Soon after the creation of the
CAFC, and mindful of its mandate to correct a “widespread
disregard of patent rights . . . undermining the national
innovation incentive,”7  the CAFC established a “due care”8
standard for willful infringement. Under the “due care” standard,
when “a potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent
rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to
determine whether or not he is infringing.”9  Although courts
considered the “totality of the circumstances” in assessing
willfulness,10  in practice, the analysis usually focused on
whether the defendant acquired an opinion of counsel.11  Thus,
when a party received a demand letter from a company accusing
them of infringement, the receiving party had an affirmative
duty to investigate that charge by obtaining an opinion of
counsel. The opinion would typically analyze both whether the
allegedly infringed patent was valid and whether the activities
actually infringed on it. Unfortunately, the opinion had
questionable value when it came to subsequent litigation. 2
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 5, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uw. du/wjlta/vol5/iss5/1
<4>Before Seagate, defendants faced a dilemma when asserting
an opinion of counsel defense. The disclosure of an opinion
letter at trial had the potential to waive both the attorney-client
privilege and attorney work-product privilege for both in-house
and litigation counsel, resulting in an advantage for the
plaintiff.12  However, if a party failed to assert the opinion to
preserve these privileges, a jury could make a negative
presumption about the contents of the letter.13
<5>Unfortunately, there was considerable confusion over the
extent of a privilege waiver,14  and the waiver was the source of
substantial secondary litigation. In 2003, the CAFC eliminated
the negative presumption that could arise for withholding an
opinion of counsel letter,15  but an effective opinion remained
the best possible defense to a willfulness charge, and many
defendants gave up their privileges in order to assert them. In
response, the CAFC attempted to clarify the scope of waiver
through an en banc hearing, but failed to successfully do so,
and perhaps even added to the confusion.16
<6>During this same period, there was increasing national
attention on the state of patent law. A lawsuit over the
Blackberry technology initiated by a patent holding company
received broad media coverage as the litigation threatened to
shut down the network.17  This may have led to the Supreme
Court's decision to hear eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, in
which the Court tempered the CAFC's position that injunctive
relief should be applied automatically upon a finding of
infringement.18  The United States Supreme Court continued to
hear patent cases where it corrected CAFC decisions to be more
in line with Supreme Court precedent,19  and the CAFC
responded by revisiting some of its own precedent in light of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. This review included the standard
for willfulness and the application of a waiver.
THE SEAGATE OPINION
<7>The CAFC heard Seagate en banc to answer three specific
questions relating to willful infringement: (1) should the
assertion of the advice of counsel defense extend also waive the
attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel;
(2) what is the effect of that waiver on work-product immunity;
and (3) should the standard for willful infringement be
changed?20  In answer to the first question, the court held that
“as a general proposition . . . asserting the advice of counsel
defense and disclosing opinions of counsel do not constitute
3
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waiver of the attorney-client privilege for communications with
trial counsel;”21  however, a waiver still may occur in “unique
circumstances” such as those involving “chicanery.”22  The CAFC
then applied this same rule to work-product immunity using the
same “general proposition” and “chicanery” language, and
noting that the Supreme Court has approved of narrowly
restricting the scope of the work product waiver.23  These
answers helped immensely to clarify that the waiver attached to
the assertion of an opinion of counsel defense. Nevertheless,
the most significant change to jurisprudence was the answer to
the third question, how the standard for willful infringement
should be changed.
<8>The CAFC specifically overruled its previous standard for
willful infringement of patents,24  and replaced it with a more
stringent standard. Again, the Seagate Court noted Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the topic, which likened willful behavior
to recklessness,25  as being the proper framework for its
decision.26  The CAFC stated that the previous standard, which
was “more akin to negligence,” is overruled, and the new
standard “requires at least a showing of objective
recklessness.”27
<9>To prevail in a claim of willfulness, a patentee must now
“show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent.”28  A patentee must “also
demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk . . . was either
known or so obvious it should have been known to the accused
infringer.”29  This holding substantially raised the bar for proving
willfulness by eliminating the affirmative obligation to obtain
opinion of counsel, which was required under the old duty of
care.30  However, the court stated that it would “leave it to
future cases to further develop the application of this
standard.”31  Since Seagate, a number of cases in both district
courts and the CAFC have demonstrated how the new standard
is being applied.
THE EFFECTS OF SEAGATE: CLEARANCE SEARCHES CAN BE
CONDUCTED WITH GREATER FREEDOM
<10>Seagate has eliminated the threat of a future charge of
willfulness as a reason to avoid clearance searches. A clearance
search is an informal survey of existing patents in a particular
field, which can be helpful for a company in developing its
patent portfolio, or in deciding a direction for product
development. Under the willfulness standard prior to Seagate, 4
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the mere knowledge of an existing patent could be enough to
trigger a claim of willfulness. The possibility of finding such a
patent discouraged some companies from conducting patent
searches, in spite of the fact that by doing so, such companies
might have avoided infringement.32
<11>Now that the standard is elevated to objective recklessness,
the likelihood of a finding of willfulness is reduced. Although it is
questionable whether avoiding clearance searches was ever a
good strategy,33  Seagate removes the incentive to avoid such
searches for fear of an incidental charge of willfulness. In fact, it
is likely that conducting a competent clearance search would be
evidence against willfulness under the reckless standard.
Regardless, actual notice is still a component of the willfulness
inquiry,34  and if a clearance search reveals a patent that might
be infringed upon, a company should take reasonable efforts to
avoid doing so.
Opinions of Counsel and the Closeness of the Case
<12>Despite the changes brought about by Seagate, opinions of
counsel are still one of the key pieces of evidence available to
defend against a charge of willful patent infringement. The CAFC
has recently stated that both legitimate defenses to infringement
claims and credible invalidity arguments are sufficient to defeat
a claim of willful infringement, but it did so without specifically
requiring the arguments be in the form of an opinion of
counsel.35  In a separate opinion, the court stated that it
“do[es] not think it was objectively reckless for [the defendant]
to obtain and rely on the opinion of counsel,” and despite the
fact that a district court ruled contrary to the opinion, “reliance
on that opinion was nonetheless justified.”36
<13>Seagate has formally removed the affirmative duty to
obtain an opinion of counsel. The CAFC said that “[b]ecause we
abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also reemphasize
that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of
counsel.”37  Because of the elimination of the affirmative duty, a
company faced with a potential infringement suit can give more
weight to the cost of an opinion of counsel. If a company
determines that there is no realistic chance of a finding of
willfulness, the company is no longer compelled to obtain an
opinion of counsel. However, if it determines that there is a
genuine issue of infringement, a competent opinion of counsel in
its favor should foreclose the possibility of a successful charge of
willfulness. An additional effect of eliminating this duty is that in
a multi-defendant lawsuit, it is more likely that a single opinion
5
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letter can cover all defendants. The pre-Seagate norm was to
have a separate opinion letter for each individual defendant.
<14>In addition, the form that the opinion of counsel should
take depends on the closeness of the case. In general, the
formality and depth of the opinion should increase as the
likelihood of infringement increases. For example, if a company
finds that the likelihood of infringement is low, then an informal
opinion in the form of a brief document should suffice as a
defense against willfulness. However, if such an opinion is later
asserted as a defense against willfulness, it must be adequately
supported by a factual or legal basis, and not be in the form of
mere conclusions.38  In contrast, if the chance of infringement is
very high or definite, then a formal opinion letter should be
obtained detailing the grounds for non-infringement or invalidity.
Such formal opinion letters are quite expensive, but if they are
obtained and relied upon in good faith, then they should prevent
the treble damages of a willfulness charge.
<15>It is possible that the closeness of the case can determine
willfulness by itself. A court has found a lack of willfulness when
the infringement analysis was a close question,39  which is one
of the original pre-Seagate factors for evaluating willfulness.40
If infringement is a close question, the circumstances should not
satisfy the requirement of an objectively high likelihood of
infringement.41  But potential defendants should proceed
cautiously if they plan on relying on the closeness of the case
as a defense because closeness is a subjective determination
made by a court, over which the litigants have little control. If
the case is close, it is still a good idea to obtain a documented
opinion of counsel, but the opinion does not need to be a formal
opinion letter.
Evidence of Attempts to Work Around Existing Patents
<16>Even where defendants have full and detailed knowledge of
a competitor’s patents, they can avoid a charge of willfulness if
the competitor can demonstrate that it attempted to work
around an existing patent. A deliberate attempt to avoid
infringement is strong evidence that a party did not willfully
infringe on an existing patent. Several recent cases at the
district court level have considered efforts to design around
existing patents sufficient to overcome a charge of willfulness.42
Furthermore, as one court pointed out, the innovation inherent
in attempts to design around a patent are good from a policy
perspective because they promote innovation, commerce and
competition.43  That same court noted that the policy is evident
6
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in the specificity and narrowness of claim construction, which
encourages people to read patents, become inspired by the
ideas in them, and innovate to find new ways of accomplishing
tasks.44
Cessation of Infringing Activities
<17>Recently, at least one court has recognized cessation of
potentially infringing activities as a factor weighing against a
claim of willfulness.45  If defendants have stopped the activities
in question, they have not acted with an objectively high
likelihood of causing harm through infringement. Although
courts have not clarified the specific time at which potential
infringers should cease their activities, it is reasonable to
conclude that they should cease them after becoming aware of
the patent at issue and making a determination on whether
there is actual infringement. Ceasing production or operations is
a drastic measure, but if a company believes it is infringing on a
valid patent, doing so would reduce both the likelihood of a
willfulness charge and the amount of damages it would have to
pay.
Issuing Demand Letters
<18>Seagate has made it more difficult to establish willfulness in
a patent infringement suit, but a patentee may still be able to
increase the likelihood of a finding of willfulness in future
litigation by drafting a detailed demand letter. Because of the
higher post-Seagate standard for knowledge of infringing
activities,46  a more detailed demand letter has a greater chance
of satisfying the willfulness analysis. A patentee should consider
including a copy of the allegedly infringed patent, a summary of
how it is infringed, and a claim chart prepared by a patent
attorney to ensure that the recipient has a high degree of
knowledge.47  It is also advisable to predict any defenses that
the alleged infringer might raise, and to include retorts to those
arguments in the letter to reduce the weight given to reliance
on those defenses in future litigation.
CONCLUSION
<19>Although Seagate has dramatically changed the standard
for willful infringement, it has not dramatically changed the
strategy for addressing an infringement claim. When a company
becomes aware of a valid patent on which it may be infringing,
it should still investigate whether it is actually infringing and
7
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whether the patent is valid. A company that fails to take these
actions and proceeds with the infringing activity is still subject
to a charge of willfulness. Under Seagate, the measures that a
company must take are now better scaled to the plausibility of
the infringement charge, at least as far as willfulness is
concerned. Furthermore, while the duty to obtain an opinion of
counsel has been formally eliminated, opinions continue to serve
important functions and are more beneficial to defendants in
litigation because of the way that Seagate changed the waiver
of privileges. Thus, Seagate has served the goals that it set out
to achieve: the standard for willfulness is more in line with the
broader law, the scope of waiver is much clearer than before,
and the dilemma faced by litigators in asserting an opinion of
counsel defense is eliminated. Overall, the new standard is good
news for defendants in patent infringement suits because it is
harder to sustain a charge of willfulness.
PRACTICE POINTERS
Conduct Clearance Analysis: Companies should
not avoid a clearance analysis based on the concern
that they will become aware of a patent, and that
awareness will lead to a later finding of willfulness.
Knowledge of existing patents will help a company
avoid infringement charges in general, and if the
company acts reasonably to avoid infringing an
existing patent, it will not be vulnerable to a
willfulness charge.
Design Around: If a company becomes aware of a
patent it might be infringing upon, a good faith effort
to design around it will probably defeat a charge of
willfulness, even if the design is later determined to
infringe.
Receiving Demand Letters: After receiving a
demand letter alleging infringement, a company
should conduct a preliminary analysis to determine
the validity of the asserted patent and the likelihood
of actual infringement. Decisions on how to proceed
should be based on a number of factors, including:
the likelihood of infringement, the possible value of
a damage award, and many practical business
considerations. If a company is unsure how to weigh
these factors, it should obtain the advice of a
competent patent attorney.
Opinions of Counsel: When in doubt, obtain an
opinion of counsel. The formality of the opinion 8
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should increase with the probability of infringement,
and formal opinion letters should be obtained if
infringement is probable and the value of a potential
suit is high.
Ceasing Activities: If a competent investigation or
opinion letter finds infringement without an invalidity
defense, a company should cease the infringing
activities to reduce the possibility of treble damages.
Issuing Demand Letters: If a company becomes
aware of a third party’s infringing activities and
wishes to issue a demand letter, a more detailed
letter has a better chance of triggering a willfulness
charge.
<< Top
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